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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
  
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
If we can avoid preoccupation with the dazzling 
number of monetary digits involved in this case (the 
contractual repo price of almost $1.2 billion, the Purchaser‟s 
claim totaling in excess of $478 million, and the parties‟ 
damages calculations that are nearly $500 million apart), the 
issue before us is limited to a determination of the meaning of 
the statutory phrase requiring damages to be measured based 
on a “commercially reasonable determinant[ ] of value.”  It is 
an issue of statutory construction such as those routinely faced 
by federal courts, although it appears to be an issue of first 
impression. 
3 
 
I. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Appellees American Home Mortgage Holdings, Inc., 
American Home Mortgage Investment Corp., American 
Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc., AHM SV, Inc.,
1
 and 
American Home Mortgage Corp. (collectively, “Debtor”), and 
Appellant Calyon New York Branch (“Calyon”),2 as 
Administrative Agent (the “Purchasers”), are parties to a 
Repurchase Agreement (the “Repurchase Agreement”), dated 
November 21, 2006, covering a portfolio of home mortgages. 
  
A repurchase agreement, often referred to as a “repo 
agreement,” is defined in § 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code 
as “an agreement, including related terms,” that (1) “provides 
for the transfer of one or more . . . mortgage loans, [or] 
interests in mortgage related securities or mortgage loans[;]” 
(2) “against the transfer of funds by the transferee of such . . . 
mortgage loans, or interests[;]” (3) “with a simultaneous 
agreement by such transferee to transfer to the transferor 
thereof . . . mortgage loans, or interests [in mortgage related 
securities or mortgage loans;]” (4) “at a date certain not later 
than 1 year after such transfer or on demand[;]” (5) “against 
the transfer of funds[.]”  In simple words, the purchaser of an 
asset promises to sell it back at the time fixed or when asked.
   
Repurchase Agreements are among the transactions governed 
by § 562 of the Bankruptcy Code which was enacted as part 
of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 910, 119 
Stat. 23, 184 (2005), described by Congress as “a 
                                                 
1
 AHM SV, Inc. was previously American Home 
Mortgage Servicing, Inc., and changed its name during the 
course of the bankruptcy proceedings as a result of the sale of 
the servicing business.   
 
2
 As of February 7, 2010, Calyon became Crédit 
Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, New York Branch. 
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comprehensive package of reform measures pertaining to both 
consumer and business bankruptcy cases.”  H.R. Rep. No. 
109-31, at 2 (2005). 
 
Pursuant to the 2006 Repurchase Agreement, Calyon 
purchased approximately 5,700 mortgage loans with an 
original unpaid principal balance of just under $1.2 billion. 
The mortgage properties were located in all fifty states of the 
United States.  The portfolio was principally comprised of 
adjustable rate mortgages and pay option adjustable rate 
mortgages, as well as a small portion of Government 
conforming loans and second lien loans.   
 
  Sometime before August 1, 2007, the Debtor 
defaulted on some of its obligations under the Repurchase 
Agreement.  Calyon served the Debtor with a notice of default 
and accelerated the Repurchase Agreement on August 1, 2007 
(the “Acceleration Date”).  Section 562 of the Bankruptcy 
Code covers the timing for measurement of damages in the 
event of acceleration.  Because of the acceleration of the 
Agreement, the Debtor became obligated to repurchase the 
mortgage loans at the Repurchase Price which, on the 
Acceleration Date, was $1,143,840,204.36.  The Debtor filed 
its voluntary petition for Chapter 11 relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code on August 6, 2007, and the case was 
assigned to Christopher S. Sontchi, a Bankruptcy Judge from 
the District of Delaware.    
 
Calyon filed four identical proofs of claim against four 
different debtors for an amount that exceeded the total 
Repurchase Price.  One year later, the Debtor filed its 
objections to the claims, seeking either to disallow them or 
reduce them pursuant to § 562 of the Bankruptcy Code.
3
  
                                                 
3
 In the interim, Calyon sought a declaratory judgment 
that its agreement with the Debtor was a “repurchase 
agreement” within the meaning of § 101(47) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  The Bankruptcy Court agreed, and held 
that Calyon‟s rights with respect to the Loan Portfolio were 
exempted from the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), and 
5 
 
Section 562, which addresses the timing for the measurement 
of damages in connection with repurchase and other 
agreements, provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) [I]f a . . . repo participant . . . liquidates, terminates, or 
accelerates such contract or agreement, damages shall be 
measured as of the earlier of -- 
 
(1) the date of such rejection; or 
 
(2) the date or dates of such liquidation, 
termination, or acceleration. 
 
(b) If there are not any commercially reasonable 
determinants of value as of any date referred to in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a), damages shall be 
measured as of the earliest subsequent date or dates on 
which there are commercially reasonable determinants 
of value.    
 
11 U.S.C. § 562 (emphasis added). 
 
The parties stipulated to four possible valuation dates 
of the Loan Portfolio:  August 1, 2007 (the Acceleration 
Date), September 30, 2007 (before the Debtor sold another 
large Loan Portfolio), January 30, 2008 (after the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s decision in In re Am. Home Mortg., Inc., 379 B.R. 
503 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008), declaring that the agreement 
constituted a repurchase agreement within the meaning of the 
Code), and August 15, 2008 (the earliest date that Calyon 
claimed it could obtain a reasonable market or sale price for 
the Loan Portfolio).   
 
The Repurchase Price on September 30, 2007 
remained $1,143,840,204.36, the same as that on the 
                                                                                                             
were not avoided or otherwise limited by any provision of the 
Code.  In re Am. Home Mortg., Inc., 379 B.R. 503, 518-520 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2008).  The Debtor does not challenge this 
holding.  
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Acceleration Date.  By January 30, 2008, Calyon had received 
payments on the mortgage loans, reducing the Repurchase 
Price to $1,070,933,296.54.  As of August 15, 2008, the 
Repurchase Price had been further reduced to 
$994,416,230.32.  Although the parties agreed on the 
stipulated dates, they vigorously disagree as to the 
methodology for the measurement of damages, and 
consequently to the amount of damages. 
 
In objecting to Calyon‟s claims, the Debtor argued that 
a “commercially reasonable determinant of value,” namely the 
Discounted Cash Flow (“DCF”) method, existed on the 
Acceleration Date and that § 562(a) accordingly fixed the 
measurement of Calyon‟s damages as of that date.  The 
Debtor claimed that using that valuation methodology, the 
value of the Loan Portfolio exceeded the Repurchase Price 
and that therefore Calyon lacked a deficiency claim as of the 
Acceleration Date.   
 
Not surprisingly, Calyon contested this interpretation, 
arguing that the only appropriate valuation methodology 
under § 562 is the market or sale value of the Loan Portfolio, 
and that because the mortgage market was dysfunctional on 
the Acceleration Date, there were no “commercially 
reasonable determinants of value” as of that date.  Calyon 
asserted that, pursuant to § 562(b), the earliest possible date 
that market or sale value could be determined was August 15, 
2008, and that as of that date the market or sale value of the 
Loan Portfolio was less than the Repurchase Price and 
resulted in a deficiency claim of $478,493,165.28 when the 
Loan Portfolio was valued on a servicing retained basis.  As 
the Bankruptcy Court had previously explained: 
 
Mortgage loans can be bought and sold on either a 
“servicing retained” or a “servicing released” basis. In a 
servicing retained sale of a mortgage loan, the seller of 
the loan retains the right to designate the mortgage loan 
servicer. 
 
7 
 
379 B.R. at 510.
4
  The Court stated that the mortgage loans 
were sold to the Purchasers on a servicing retained basis, and 
because the Debtor designated AHM SV, Inc., as the servicer, 
it was entitled to a monthly servicing fee. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court held a two-day evidentiary 
hearing on the Debtor=s objections.  The Bankruptcy Court 
recognized that if the Debtor was correct that the value of the 
Loan Portfolio on the Acceleration Date exceeded the 
Repurchase Price on that date, Calyon would not have any 
deficiency or damage claim.  Thus, the Court proceeded to 
determine the value of the assets subject to the Repo 
Agreement, i.e., the Loan Portfolio.     
 
During the hearing, the Court heard testimony from the 
Debtor‟s expert, Dr. Ronnie Clayton,5 who explained that the 
                                                 
4
 The Repurchase Agreement spells out the duties of 
the servicer, which include responsibility for collecting the 
monthly mortgage payments of principal and interest, 
monitoring past-due accounts and reporting on defaulted 
loans.  In response to Calyon‟s subsequent objection to this 
arrangement, on August 8, 2008 the Bankruptcy Court 
approved the stipulation dated July 21, 2008, authorizing 
transfer of the Service Mortgage Servicing Rights to Calyon 
for all purposes.   
 
5
 Dr. Clayton holds the Glenn Huie Eminent Scholar 
Chair at Jacksonville State University in Jacksonville, 
Alabama.  He received his Ph.D. in finance, with minors in 
real estate, economics, and econometrics, from the University 
of Georgia in 1982.  As a visiting scholar at the Federal Home 
Loan Bank Board‟s Office of Policy and Economic Research, 
he developed a model of mortgage cash flows to assist the 
valuation of savings and loans assets.  After he left as a 
scholar, Dr. Clayton‟s work consisted of analyzing the risk 
associated with collateralized mortgage obligations, 
examining the cash flows of a mortgage portfolio, and 
assessing the appropriateness of bank activities in the sub-
prime mortgage market.  He has published articles dealing 
8 
 
Discounted Cash Flow analysis values the asset‟s cash flow.  
There was evidence that the cash stream from the Loan 
Portfolio, i.e., principal and interest that the loans generated, 
was approximately $275 million as of the date of the hearing 
on May 19, 2009.
6
  To determine the DCF value of the entire 
Loan Portfolio, Dr. Clayton determined the DCF value of 
each individual mortgage.  He adjusted the interest rate on 
each mortgage to reflect market conditions, as described in 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation‟s Primary 
Mortgage Market Survey, conducted by Freddie Mac.  He 
also took into account actual delinquency rates on the 
mortgage loans as of the particular valuation date.
7
  Dr. 
                                                                                                             
with mortgage interest rates and the relationship of those 
mortgage interest rates to other interest rates in the market, 
and other articles addressing the performance of saving 
associations.  The Court found Dr. Clayton to be an expert in 
the area of finance and specifically in the area of valuations of 
assets that generate cash flows.   
 
6
  At oral argument, counsel for the Debtor calculated 
that as 20% of the asset value as of August, 2008, and stated 
that it reached 25% as of the date of the hearing. 
 
7
 Dr. Clayton‟s valuation did not take into account the 
subsequent deterioration of credit performance and increase in 
delinquency rates.  With regard to how the actual delinquency 
rates factored into the DCF methodology, Dr. Clayton 
testified as follows: 
 
Q: Did you utilize the actual delinquency information 
from the mortgage data? 
  
A:   I did.  And then we would then take the present 
value of those, as interest rates fluctuated, you would adjust 
those. 
 
Q:   How did you determine the recovery at 50% under 
the line item for that? 
 
A:   When a mortgage becomes delinquent, at that 
9 
 
Clayton‟s relevant testimony is set forth in the margin.  He 
then applied the adjusted rates to discounted cash flows on 
each mortgage as of each of the four stipulated dates, the sum 
of which resulted in the valuation of the Loan Portfolio as of 
each of those dates.  Dr. Clayton testified that using this 
valuation method, the value of the Loan Portfolio on each of 
the stipulated dates exceeded the applicable Repurchase Price, 
leading the Bankruptcy Court to conclude that Calyon 
suffered no damage during the relevant period.  Calyon did 
not, and does not now, attack the methodology Dr. Clayton 
used to calculate the DCF but only attacks DCF as a 
recognizable commercially reasonable determinant of value. 
 
Dr. Clayton also testified that he did not deviate in any 
way from the accepted methodology to conduct a DCF 
valuation of each mortgage.  He explained that “[u]nless there 
is something very, very strange going on in the market, the 
market value of the assets and the discounted cash flow value 
of the assets will be very, very similar . . . .”  App. at 540.  All 
of the experts (and the parties) agreed that the secondary 
mortgage market was dysfunctional on August 1, 2007 (the 
Acceleration Date).  Dr. Clayton noted that even in a 
dysfunctional market his valuation of the Loan Portfolio 
would be the same because the assets “are held for the cash 
flow, not for the distress sale in the market.”  App. at 550.   
                                                                                                             
point, you know, we know we got -- we have an issue.  
And you may recover everything from a delinquency, or 
you may recover nothing.  And, you know, it depends 
upon the efforts that you put forth, and a variety of other 
things. 
 
But, if you take the average of zero recovery and a 
100% recovery, if  -- you know, assuming in that case, 
the property was probably sold to recover -- for enough 
to recover everything, then the average between those 
two numbers is 50%.  And so I -- that‟s what I utilized.   
 
App. at 546.  
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The premise underlying the acceptance of the DCF 
methodology for the case is that the Loan Portfolio held by 
Calyon was held, and not sold, at that time.  Calyon‟s counsel 
stated at oral argument that Calyon had the option to retain the 
Loan Portfolio.  Admittedly, Calyon did not purchase the 
Loan Portfolio to have an income stream.  Its intent was to 
resell the Portfolio within the year.  However, the Repurchase 
Agreement gave Calyon the right to retain the Loan Portfolio, 
and it chose that option in light of the distressed market.  Both 
counsel for the Debtor and for Calyon agreed that a sale on or 
about the Acceleration Date would not have been 
“commercially reasonable.”  
 
The Court also heard testimony from Calyon‟s 
witnesses; its managing director, John-Charles van Essche,
8
 
and its expert, Robert Branthover.
9
  Van Essche testified that 
                                                 
8
 Van Essche worked in Calyon‟s workout and 
distressed asset department.  That department handled “the 
distressed and workout situations at the bank, either loans or 
investments that have gone bad.”  App. at 586.  His group was 
charged with managing those assets in order “to maximize 
recoveries and/or minimize losses.”  Id.  His group was also 
charged with managing the Repurchase Agreement.  Van 
Essche stated that, with respect to the Repurchase Agreement: 
“I‟m the point person for all matters concerning this 
transaction.  I‟m the one who deals with the debtor where 
there needs to be an interaction with the debtor and the case 
here, this particular situation where there‟s litigation.  I‟m the 
one that‟s involved in running that with attorneys . . . .  I 
basically run this transaction, manage it for the group at 
large.”  App. at 587-88. 
 
9
 Branthover is the Senior Vice President in charge of 
the Secondary Solutions Group at Mortgage Industry 
Advisory Corporation (“MIAC”).  He was retained by Calyon 
to testify regarding the market value of the mortgages in the 
Loan Portfolio, i.e., to determine the fair value that those 
loans could be sold for in the marketplace.  Branthover 
graduated with a B.S. in finance from the University of 
11 
 
there were issues with the Loan Portfolio that affected its 
salability on the Acceleration Date.  He explained that, among 
other things, there was a dispute as to the ownership of the 
Loan Portfolio, there were issues regarding servicing, and 
Calyon lacked complete records on the mortgage loans.
10
  
According to him, “all those elements put together made it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for [Calyon] to sell 
these loans at anything close to a reasonable price, assuming 
there was a market there in the first place.”  App. at 607.   
 
Branthover similarly testified to the issues affecting the 
salability of the Loan Portfolio, and opined that the value of 
the Loan Portfolio as of the Acceleration Date was “extremely 
                                                                                                             
Maryland.  He had worked in the financial services industry 
for twenty years, and in the most recent ten he had been 
involved, almost exclusively, with the mortgage industry, 
valuing mortgage product, pricing from an origination, 
hedging from a distribution perspective, and selling that 
collateral under the secondary market.  Branthover explained 
that MIAC writes software that permits institutions to manage 
their mortgage portfolios to value mortgage collateral, hedges 
advisory services and works with mortgage companies to 
allow MIAC or the companies to price, hedge and sell their 
mortgages into the secondary market, does consulting work, 
and also does valuation work.  The Court found that 
Branthover was an expert on the subject of mortgage 
valuation.   
 
10
 The parties stipulated in the Bankruptcy Court to the 
following facts:  (1) the Debtor initially asserted that it was 
the legal owner of the mortgage loans and its proceeds; (2) the 
Bankruptcy Court held that as of January 30, 2008, Calyon 
owned the mortgage loans;  (3) Calyon did not receive, and 
the Debtor did not send to Calyon, the proceeds from the 
mortgage loans until after the entry of a stipulation on January 
25, 2008; and (4) as of January 30, 2008, Calyon did not have 
complete and accurate copies of the mortgage files related to 
the mortgage loans.   
 
12 
 
low,” ascribing it a value of ten cents on the dollar, or ten 
percent of the unpaid principal balance.  App. at 705.
11
  He 
explained that this value was a result of “the title who owned 
the loans [being] in question, the MERS identification, the 
proceeds of the loans being unknown, incomplete document, 
no reps and warranties, and generally a poor market.”  Id.  
Branthover further opined that the value of the Loan Portfolio 
on August 15, 2008, the earliest date upon which Calyon 
claimed it could have sold the Loan Portfolio at a reasonable 
price, was $515,923,065.04 on a servicing retained basis and 
$510,862,841.14 on a servicing released basis, still far below 
the Repurchase Price of $994,416,230.32 on that date.
12
    
 
Of note, the Debtor cross examined van Essche about a 
letter Calyon sent in May 2008 to the Shared National Credit 
Program (“SNC”),13 appealing the SNC‟s rating of the Loan 
                                                 
11
  Branthover testified that were there no salability 
issues the value of the Loan Portfolio would be fifty cents on 
the dollar.  App. at 727. 
 
12
  Branthover did not state, when asked, that his 
opinion regarding the value of the Loan Portfolio on August 
15, 2008 represented a “reasonable” price.  He was asked: 
“[F]ocusing on the August 15th, 2008 value, taking into 
consideration the facts and circumstances that existed on 
August 15
th
, 2008 with respect to the Calyon portfolio, could 
the Calyon portfolio have been sold on that date for a 
reasonable price?”  App. at 717.  Branthover responded: 
“„Reasonable‟ is not for me to decide.  But I think it could 
have been sold, yes.”  Id. 
 
13
 “The Shared National Credit Program was 
established in 1977 by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to provide 
an efficient and consistent review and classification of any 
large syndicated loan.”  Shared National Credit Program, 
Federal Reserve.Gov, http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/econresdata /releases/snc/snc.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2011). 
13 
 
Portfolio.
14
  In that letter, which van Essche wrote, Calyon 
had minimized the deficiencies in the Loan Portfolio that van 
Essche stated at the Bankruptcy hearing adversely affected the 
portfolio‟s salability.15  Calyon noted in the letter, “the 
existence of deficiencies does not impact sales value as long 
as the bank purchasers make and stand behind representations 
and warranties that would be made in connection with sales.” 
 App. at 438.  Moreover, in that letter Calyon disputed the 
contention that it lacked a desire to liquidate the portfolio 
under current market conditions, stating that “[t]his is true 
only because it makes more sense to sell when liquidity in the 
market recovers, which will result in higher prices.  In the 
mean time, portfolio collections of P&I and full payoffs 
continue, thus reducing exposure.  The strategy being 
employed by holding is to maximize value.”  Id. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court was not persuaded by the 
testimony of van Essche or Branthover.  Rather, in addressing 
this issue of first impression, the Bankruptcy Court agreed 
with the Debtor, concluding the phrase “commercially 
reasonable determinants of value” is not limited only to the 
market or sale value of an asset and that the Debtor=s 
proffered method of evaluation, the DCF method, was such a 
“commercially reasonable determinant of value.”  In re Am. 
Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 411 B.R. 181, 199 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2009).   
 
The Bankruptcy Court stated that it was resorting to 
“first principles.”  Id. at 191.  It began its analysis by 
concluding that § 562 was ambiguous, in part based on a 
                                                                                                             
    
14
 The SNC review found that Calyon‟s entire portfolio 
would have to be classified at 100% Doubtful.  Calyon was 
concerned with that classification because it would have 
required it to set a 50% loan loss valuation reserve.   
 
15
 The letter explained that the “difference in selling 
price caused by the servicing rights issue” was minimal.  App. 
at 437.    
14 
 
perceived conflict with § 559, the Code provision governing 
the disposition of excess proceeds upon liquidation of assets 
under a repurchase agreement.  Id. at 190.  It found the 
legislative history surrounding § 562 to be “extremely 
sparse.”  Id.  The Bankruptcy Court examined the purpose and 
intent of the Code provisions relating to repurchase 
agreements, noting that “the primary purpose of the Code 
provisions relating to repurchase agreements is to preserve 
liquidity in the relevant assets, including mortgage loans and 
interests in mortgage loans.”  Id. at 191.  It stated that § 562 
“align[s] the risks and rewards associated with an investment 
in those assets,” and prevents the “moral hazard” that would 
result if damages were measured at a date other than the date 
of termination, acceleration, or liquidation, such that “the repo 
participant [here Calyon] could hold the asset at little or no 
risk.”  Id.  “[T]his would make the debtor an insurer of the 
repo participant‟s investment even though the debtor has no 
control over the management of the asset-thus, the moral 
hazard.”  Id. 
 
In attempting to determine the value of an asset, the 
Court reasoned that value is the asset‟s “material or monetary 
worth, i.e., „the amount of money, goods, etc., for which a 
thing can be exchanged and traded.‟”  Id. (quoting Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary 3495 (6th ed. 2007)).  The 
Bankruptcy Court noted that inefficient or dysfunctional 
markets may not fairly estimate the potential sale price of an 
asset.  Id. at 192.  The Bankruptcy Court continued, “[t]here is 
nothing in section 562 that would imply a limitation on any 
methodology used to determine value, provided it is 
commercially reasonable.  Indeed, the use of the word 
determinants suggests just the opposite-that any commercially 
reasonable valuation may be used.”  Id.  Based on this 
reasoning, and its concern with the moral hazard the Code is 
designed to prevent, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that “the 
phrase „commercially reasonable determinants of value,‟ as 
used in Section 562 of the Code means that any commercially 
reasonable valuation methodology may be used as evidence of 
the damages under a repurchase agreement after its rejection, 
liquidation, termination or acceleration.”  Id. at 193. 
15 
 
 
With respect to whether the DCF method constituted a 
“commercially reasonable determinant of value,” the 
Bankruptcy Court concluded that it was.  The Bankruptcy 
Court found that the Debtor had overcome its initial burden of 
rebutting the presumption of validity of Calyon‟s claims.  Id. 
at 196.  It found Dr. Clayton credible and his methodology to 
be generally accepted within the relevant field.  Id. The 
Bankruptcy Court found the entirety of Calyon‟s evidence, 
which focused on the quality of the loans and their ownership 
issues, to be irrelevant.  Id. at 197.  That testimony related 
only to whether Calyon could sell the Loan Portfolio.  
Significantly, the Bankruptcy Court had concluded that a sale 
or market price was not the only commercially reasonable 
determinant of value contemplated by § 562.  Moreover, the 
Bankruptcy Court found van Essche‟s testimony to be not 
credible in light of the letter he sent to the SNC.  Id. at 196-
97.  The Bankruptcy Court recognized that the representations 
van Essche made in that letter were directly contradictory to 
his testimony at the hearing.  Id.  
 
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court sustained the 
Debtor‟s objections and ordered the repurchase claims 
expunged.   
 
II. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 502; 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b), 1334.  Calyon filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
judgment.  The statute also permits the parties to jointly 
certify the Bankruptcy Court‟s order that involves “a question 
of law as to which there is no controlling decision of the court 
of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the 
United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i), which the parties 
jointly certified in this case.  See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
8001(f)(2).  Forty-one days after the Bankruptcy Court‟s 
judgment, the parties filed their joint certification in the 
16 
 
District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).  We hold 
that both the joint certification and joint petition for 
permission to appeal were timely filed.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
158(d)(2)(E); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001(f)(1), (5).  We 
therefore have jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 
 
III. 
 
Analysis 
 
We proceed first with Calyon‟s argument that the 
Bankruptcy Court erred (1) in concluding that § 562 is 
ambiguous and (2) in interpreting the phrase “commercially 
reasonable determinants of value” to mean that “any 
commercially reasonable valuation methodology may be used 
as evidence of the damages under a repurchase agreement 
after its rejection, liquidation, termination or acceleration.”  In 
re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 411 B.R. at 193.   
 
The proper construction of the phrase “commercially 
reasonable determinants of value” in § 562(a) has not, to our 
knowledge, been previously addressed by any of the courts of 
appeals.  Our role in interpreting the statute is to give effect to 
Congress‟ intent.  In re Lord Abbett Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 
553 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2009).  If that intent is made plain, 
it is unnecessary for us to refer to other cannons of statutory 
construction, and indeed we should not do so.  United States 
v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2000); see In re Phila. 
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  To 
determine whether a statute‟s meaning is plain, we begin with 
its text.  Gregg, 226 F.3d at 257.  “[C]ourts must presume that 
a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says there.”  Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 
U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).  Often, that initial inquiry is also the 
last that need be made.  “If the language of a statute expresses 
Congress‟s intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends 
there and the statute is enforced according to its terms.”  
Gregg, 266 F.3d at 257.  
 
The Supreme Court has indicated a reluctance to 
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declare provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ambiguous.  See In 
re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Kelly v. 
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986)).  It has instead instructed 
that courts “not be guided by a single sentence or member of a 
sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to 
its object and policy.”  Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43 (quotations 
omitted). 
 
With this instruction in mind, we next return to the text 
of § 562.  That statute provides:  
 
(a) [I]f a . . . repo participant, . . . liquidates, terminates, 
or accelerates such contract or agreement, damages shall 
be measured as of the earlier of-- 
  
  (1) the date of such rejection; or 
 
(2) the date or dates of such liquidation, 
termination, or acceleration. 
 
(b) If there are not any commercially reasonable 
determinants of value as of any date referred to in 
paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a), damages shall be 
measured as of the earliest subsequent date or dates on 
which there are commercially reasonable determinants 
of value.    
 
11 U.S.C. § 562 (emphasis added). 
 
The Bankruptcy Court declared § 562 “ambiguous as 
to whether (i) the damage calculation is limited to either 
selling the assets or checking the market price of those assets; 
or (ii) damages may be measured by some other commercially 
reasonable method.”  In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 
411 B.R. at 191.  It found that this ambiguity was a result of 
the “conflict” between § 562 and § 559.  Id. at 190.  We are 
not persuaded that there is any conflict between § 562 and § 
559 in the Bankruptcy Code.                    
 
Section 559, to which the Bankruptcy Court referred, 
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provides in relevant part: 
 
In the event that a repo participant . . . liquidates one or 
more repurchase agreements with a debtor and under the 
terms of one or more such agreements has agreed to 
deliver assets subject to repurchase agreements to the 
debtor, any excess of the market prices received on 
liquidation of such assets (or if any such assets are not 
disposed of on the date of liquidation of such repurchase 
agreements, at the prices available at the time of 
liquidation of such repurchase agreements from a 
generally recognized source or the most recent closing 
bid quotation from such a source) over the sum of the 
stated repurchase prices and all expenses in connection 
with the liquidation of such repurchase agreements shall 
be deemed property of the estate, subject to the available 
rights of setoff.  
 
11 U.S.C. § 559 (emphasis added). 
 
Sections 559 and 562 address different situations.  
Section 559 applies only in the event that a repurchase 
agreement is liquidated, and the liquidation results in excess 
proceeds (where the proceeds from the market prices exceed 
the stated repurchase prices).  If any assets are not disposed of 
on the date of liquidation, those assets are valued at the prices 
available at the time of liquidation from a generally 
recognized source or the most recent closing bid quotation 
from such a source.  On the other hand, § 562 which covers, 
inter alia, repurchase agreements, applies when the contract is 
liquidated, terminated, or accelerated, and results in damages 
rather than excess proceeds.   
 
We see no conflict between these provisions and 
therefore agree with Calyon in rejecting the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s conclusion that § 562 is ambiguous because it is in 
conflict with § 559.  The fact that the parties proffer different 
interpretations of the statutory language does not make the 
language ambiguous.  It just makes the court‟s role difficult in 
deciding which interpretation is persuasive. 
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Calyon‟s second argument with the Bankruptcy 
Court‟s conclusion that the market or sale price is not the only 
reasonable determinant of value of the asset is the centerpiece 
of Calyon‟s position in this case.  The Debtor responds that 
because the market was dysfunctional there was no 
commercially reasonable market value on the Acceleration 
Date.   
 
Calyon‟s proofs of claim carried a presumption of 
validity.  Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f) (“A proof of claim 
executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall 
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of 
the claim.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (claim deemed 
allowed unless party in interest objects).  It was therefore the 
Debtor‟s initial burden to rebut the presumption of the validity 
of Calyon‟s proofs of claim.  This entailed a demonstration 
that Calyon‟s reliance on the market value was not 
“commercially reasonable” but that other commercially 
reasonable determinants of value existed as of the 
Acceleration Date.  See 11 U.S.C. § 562(c)(2) (if damages not 
measured as of date of acceleration and trustee objects, repo 
participant has burden to show that no commercially 
reasonable determinants of value existed as of that date); H.R. 
Rep. No. 109-31, at 135 (2005).
16    
 
In the Bankruptcy Court, the Debtor proffered at least 
two methodologies to determine damages that it claimed were 
“commercially reasonable determinants of value” that existed 
on the Acceleration Date.  One was the DCF based largely on 
the testimony of its expert witness, Dr. Clayton.  The other 
was market analyses that Calyon had obtained outside of the 
context of this litigation.  The Bankruptcy Court concluded 
that the latter was not a commercially reasonable determinant 
of the Loan Portfolio‟s value because the market was 
                                                 
16
 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(46) (“repo participant” means 
“an entity that, at any time before the filing of the petition, has 
an outstanding repurchase agreement with the debtor”). 
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distressed.  In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 411 B.R. 
at 198.  The Debtor does not press this issue on appeal and 
instead limits its proposed alternative commercially 
reasonable determinant of value to the DCF methodology.  
The Debtor principally relied on the testimony of Dr. Clayton 
to support its position.  His testimony is discussed in detail 
above.  See text and accompanying notes at Typescript Op. at 
7-9. 
 
Dr. Clayton testified that the DCF valuation 
methodology is a particularly apt methodology for valuing 
debt instruments such as mortgage loans where the owner is 
receiving the cash flows.  As he explained, the assets “are 
held for the cash flow, not for the distress sale in the market.” 
 App. at 550.  Only in unusual circumstances will the cash 
flow valuation differ from the market price.   
 
Calyon‟s challenge to the use of the DCF valuation 
method as a commercially reasonable determinant of value is 
essentially directed to what it argues are the deficiencies in 
the Loan Portfolio.  Among those deficiencies are what it 
claims is the DCF‟s failure “to account for the subsequent 
deterioration of credit performance.”  Appellant‟s Br. at 47.  
Calyon‟s experts also focused their testimony on problems 
they saw with the loans, such as the dispute regarding the 
ownership of the loans, the direction of the proceeds, and 
questions regarding the servicing.  As the Bankruptcy Court  
recognized, these problems relate to the difficulties that would 
affect the market price or sale price of the Loan Portfolio, 
were it placed on the market for sale.   
 
The Bankruptcy Court stated,    
 
Even if the Court were to find Mr. van Essche‟s 
testimony on this issue credible, it would have no effect 
on the Court‟s conclusion.  The Court finds that the 
issues regarding the quality of the loans and their 
ownership are irrelevant to the issue of whether 
“commercially reasonable determinants of value” existed 
on the Acceleration Date. The evidence submitted shows 
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that, from the time of the Acceleration Date, Calyon had 
no intention of selling the Loan Portfolio due to the 
dysfunctional state of the market. 
 
 Because Calyon‟s 
intent was to hold the loans, and not sell them, testimony 
regarding the variables that might have had an impact on 
a sale price is not relevant.  Moreover, the entire issue 
appears to be one contrived solely for purposes of this 
litigation.  Accordingly, the Court will not consider the 
problems with the loans in its analysis and, even if it 
were to do so, would give such problems minimal 
weight. 
 
411 B.R. at 197 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
The Bankruptcy Court thus honed in on the intrinsic 
problem with Calyon‟s position in this case.  All the parties 
agree that the secondary mortgage market was dysfunctional 
on the Acceleration Date, and because of that market 
condition, it was not reasonable to sell the Loan Portfolio.  
Indeed, Calyon made no effort to sell the Loan Portfolio.  
Instead, it retained the Loan Portfolio and received and 
retained the income generated by the mortgages that 
constituted that portfolio. 
 
We find the Bankruptcy Court‟s analysis persuasive.  It 
stated that the market price should be used to determine an 
asset‟s value when the market is functioning properly.  It is 
only when the market is dysfunctional and the market price 
does not reflect an asset‟s worth should one turn to other 
determinants of value.  Id. at 193 (“When a sale would be 
unreasonable or cannot be performed one turns to the market 
price, [h]owever, if a market price is unavailable or the 
market is disrupted or dysfunctional one must use a different 
method to discover the value of the asset.”).    
 
We agree with the Debtor‟s characterization of the 
logical flaw in Calyon‟s position that only the market price 
should be considered.  It states, “In cases like the case at bar, 
where the court concludes that a valuation methodology other 
than a market value (in a dysfunctional market context) 
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evidences that the asset‟s value exceeds the underlying 
repurchase price obligation, the result is not that the counter-
party is deprived of recourse to recover its damages, but rather 
that the counter-party has incurred no damages capable of 
being recovered.”  Appellee‟s Br. at 35.   Accordingly, we do 
not share Calyon‟s concern that our reading of § 562 of the 
Code will chill the repurchase agreement market.  To the 
contrary, as the Bankruptcy Court stated, Calyon‟s 
interpretation involves a moral hazard that is counter to the 
policy of preserving liquidity.  See Typescript Op. at 14.  In 
short, if Congress had intended § 562 to be limited to market 
or sale price, it would have said so.  It did so in § 559. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court agreed with the Debtor‟s 
analysis.  It concluded that Calyon did not meet its burden of 
demonstrating that no commercially reasonable determinant 
of value existed on the Acceleration Date.  It found credible 
the testimony of Dr. Clayton that the DCF analysis is a 
commercially reasonable methodology for determining the 
value of the Loan Portfolio, and that a DCF analysis of the 
Loan Portfolio showed the value of the loans was either 
$1,162,817,745.15 (servicing included with mortgages) or 
$1,148,282,523.34 (servicing not included with mortgages).  
It found that Calyon‟s argument that the quality of the Loan 
Portfolio prevented it from obtaining a commercially 
reasonable price at market on the Acceleration Date to be 
irrelevant, noting that Calyon‟s position in the litigation was 
not credible because it was far different than the position it 
took with the SNC during its review process.  It characterized 
Calyon‟s testimony as appearing litigation driven. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court also found the testimony of 
Calyon‟s expert witness to be irrelevant and “that Calyon‟s 
internal valuation analysis and the market analyses performed 
by Calyon‟s advisor, Compass, do not fairly reflect the Loan 
Portfolio‟s market value as of that date because the market 
was dysfunctional.”  In re Am. Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 
411 B.R. at 199.  
 
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court found that “the 
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value of the Loan Portfolio exceeds the amount of Calyon‟s 
Claim” and that as a result “Calyon has no deficiency claim 
and therefore no damage claim under Section 562.”  Id.  The 
Court thus concluded that Calyon has shown no damages 
under § 562 and sustained the Debtor‟s objections to the 
repurchase claims and directed expunging those repurchase 
claims. 
 
We hold that Bankruptcy Judge Sontchi‟s findings and 
conclusions are persuasive and supported by the evidence.  
We will therefore affirm the Bankruptcy Court‟s order. 
 
1 
 
RENDELL, Concurring. 
 
I join in Judge Sloviter's fine opinion and write 
separately only to note that while I was initially skeptical of 
Judge Sontchi's view that a valuation based on discounted 
cash flow (DCF) was an appropriate “commercially 
reasonable determinant[ ] of value” of a repurchase 
agreement, I now wholeheartedly endorse this view.  The 
factors that I believed, at first, warranted the conclusion that 
sale price was the only “commercially reasonable 
determinant[ ] of value” of a repurchase agreement were 
twofold: first, the Bankruptcy Code treats repurchase 
agreements differently, permitting these transactions to be 
exempt from the automatic stay provisions because of the 
need for their liquidity.  11 U.S.C. § 559; See American Home 
Mortgage Holdings, Inc., 411 B.R. 181, 190 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2009); See Also Bankruptcy Law and Repurchase 
Agreements: Hearings on S. 445 Before the Subcomm. on 
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 98
th
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess. 306 (1983) (Statement of Peter 
Sternlight, Executive Vice President, Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York).  Accordingly, I thought, their value in a sale, 
i.e. a liquidation, should provide the basis for damages.  
Second, the term „commercially reasonable‟ is usually 
associated with „disposition‟, such that it anticipates a sale.  
Black’s Law Dictionary 305 (9th ed. 2009); U.C.C. § 9-610 
(b).     
 
However, I now conclude that Judge Sontchi was 
correct for three reasons.  First, the statute clearly uses the 
plural of “determinants” so that sale price should not be 
viewed as exclusive.  Second, while admittedly 'commercially 
2 
reasonable' is linked most often with 'disposition', the 
determination of what is „commercially reasonable‟ involves 
a fact-intensive inquiry, dependent on the totality of the 
circumstances, and calls for an examination of the particular 
situation, which may not include a sale.  See United States v. 
Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1306 (3d Cir. 
1986); See also Victaulic v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 235 (3d 
Cir. 2007)(“[T]he determination of reasonableness is a factual 
one, requiring consideration of all the facts and 
circumstances.” (quoting WellSpan Health v. Bayliss, 869 
A.2d 990, 999 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005))).  Third, and along those 
same lines, here, Calyon acknowledges that it has retained the 
mortgages and is receiving the monthly payments, i.e. the 
cash flow.  Given this particular fact setting, a “determinant[ ] 
of value” that would appear to be “commercially reasonable” 
– indeed, perhaps the most reasonable – is DCF because 
Calyon clearly has determined that it will maximize its value 
by retaining the mortgages, preferring to receive the cash 
flow over time, rather than selling them.  Thus, I believe 
Judge Sontchi was correct, as are we, and Calyon has no 
damage claim. 
